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Abstract 25 
In recent years, neuroscience research spent much effort in revealing brain activity related to 26 
metacognition. Despite this endeavor, it remains unclear exactly when metacognitive experiences 27 
develop during task performance. To investigate this, the current study used EEG to temporally and 28 
spatially dissociate task-related activity from metacognitive activity. In a masked priming paradigm, 29 
metacognitive experiences of difficulty were induced by manipulating congruency between prime and 30 
target. As expected, participants more frequently rated incongruent trials as difficult and congruent 31 
trials as easy, while being completely unable to perceive the masked primes. Results showed that 32 
both the N2 and the P3 ERP components were modulated by congruency, but that only the P3 33 
modulation interacted with metacognitive experiences. Single-trial analysis additionally showed that 34 
the magnitude of the P3 modulation by congruency accurately predicted the metacognitive response. 35 
Source localization indicated that the N2 task-related activity originated in the ACC, whereas the P3-36 
interplay between task-related activation and metacognitive experiences originated from the 37 
precuneus. We conclude that task-related activity can be dissociated from later metacognitive 38 
processing.   39 
 40 
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Introduction 43 
When acting upon stimuli in the environment, our actions are accompanied by metacognitive 44 
experiences. For example, when typing on a foreign keyboard, you will clearly experience that your 45 
actions do not proceed very fluently. While the neurocognitive underpinnings of metacognition have 46 
recently received a lot of attention (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, 47 
Dolan, & Rees, 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013), it remains unclear how these metacognitive experiences 48 
develop in time. For example, it is highly debated whether metacognitive experiences associated 49 
with our actions are created at the same time of the decision to act, or whether they also depend on 50 
new information arriving beyond this decision point (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). More generally, it 51 
is unknown at which point in time specific neural processes contribute to the creation of 52 
metacognitive experiences.  53 
Metacognition, a general term used to describe the subjective experiences associated with 54 
our actions, has been studied in a variety of research fields. In the meta-memory literature, 55 
researchers have extensively investigated subjective experiences associated with memory formation, 56 
such as judgments-of-learning during acquisition (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008), and feeling-of-knowing 57 
during recall (e.g., Díaz, Lindín, Galdo-Alvarez, Facal, & Juncos-Rabadán, 2007). In the neurocognitive 58 
literature, most studies use low-level perceptual decision tasks, and examine the degree of 59 
confidence associated with decisions (de Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014; Fleming & Lau, 2014; Fleming 60 
et al., 2010) or the awareness of having made an error in the decision process (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; 61 
Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). In the current study, we focus on one particular class of metacognitive 62 
experiences, namely the experience of fluency in action-selection. Several recent studies already 63 
demonstrated that participants can reliably introspect on the fluency of their action-selection, even 64 
when they are unaware of the stimuli manipulating the fluency of selection. For example, Charles et 65 
al. (2013) showed that participants could differentiate between correct and incorrect judgments in a 66 
simple decision task, even though they did not perceive the stimulus they had to decide on. In a 67 
similar vein, studies have used subliminal priming to create a conflict between two responses, and 68 
observed that task performance and perceived difficulty were jointly influenced, without participants 69 
being aware of the visual stimuli driving these changes (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Desender, Van 70 
Opstal, & Van den Bussche, 2014; Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010). That is, even though 71 
participants are completely unaware of the presence of the subliminal stimuli creating the response 72 
conflict, they nevertheless have the metacognitive experience that responding was more difficult on 73 
those trials where the subliminal stimulus interfered with response selection. A major benefit of 74 
these conflict paradigms is that a large body of research has already documented the neural 75 
components associated with the processing of response conflicts. However, while it was recently 76 
demonstrated that metacognitive experiences are critically involved in conflict processing (Desender 77 
et al., 2014), the role of metacognitive experiences in relation to these components has not been 78 
studied. 79 
Conflict tasks are known to reliably modulate two important event-related components 80 
(ERPs) in the EEG waveform (Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, & Endrass, 2014). First, a fronto-central N2 81 
component around 200 - 300 ms post-stimulus is observed, which is believed to reflect a sensitivity 82 
of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) to the activation of incompatible responses (Van Veen & Carter, 83 
2002). Later in time, a central-parietal P3 component around 300 - 400 ms post-stimulus emerges, 84 
whose functional role is still a matter of debate. Some consider it to be an index of stimulus 85 
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evaluation (Coles, Gratton, Bashore, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985; Purmann, Badde, Luna-Rodriguez, & 86 
Wendt, 2011), whereas others assume that the P3 reflects the engagement of attentional resources 87 
needed for improved control (Clayson & Larson, 2011; West, 2003). Interestingly, the P3 component 88 
is also considered as a signature for conscious access (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007; Kouider et 89 
al., 2013), making it a likely neural correlate of metacognitive awareness in conflict tasks.  90 
Based on existing evidence, both the N2 and P3 could be involved in metacognition. First, 91 
noting that activity in the ACC is related to both cognitive (e.g., response conflict, errors) and 92 
affective (e.g., pain) factors, Spunt and colleagues (2012) showed that the ACC tracks changes in 93 
subjective experience, such as frustration and negative affect (for theoretical perspectives, see e.g., 94 
Hillman & Bilkey, 2013; Shackman et al., 2011). Therefore, metacognition could be related to activity 95 
in the ACC, reflected by the N2 component. Second, research on error processing revealed that 96 
awareness of one’s own errors selectively modulates the error positivity (Pe) around 300 ms post-97 
response (Hughes & Yeung, 2011; Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001), whereas 98 
the earlier error related negativity (ERN; originating from the ACC; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004) 99 
is only modulated by objective accuracy (although this latter claim has been contested, see e.g., 100 
Scheffers & Coles, 2000; Shalgi & Deouell, 2012; Wessel, 2012). Given that the Pe is considered to be 101 
the error-related homologue of the P3 (Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009), metacognition 102 
should be expressed in the P3 component only.  103 
 In short, while both the N2 and the P3 could theoretically be linked to metacognitive 104 
experiences, this has not been tested before. The aim of the current study is to investigate this and 105 
to dissociate task-related activity from activity related to metacognitive experiences. 106 
 107 
 108 
109 
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Materials and Methods 110 
Participants 111 
Thirty-one participants, 17 female and 14 male, participated in return for a monetary 112 
compensation (£15). Mean age of the sample was 24.3 years (SD = 5.2, range 19-42). All participants 113 
were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had no history of epilepsy and were 114 
not taking psychoactive drugs. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of 115 
Essex and written informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to the experimental 116 
session. Because of intense sweating, caused by extreme hot weather conditions, and resulting noise 117 
on the EEG recordings, the data of six participants were unfit for analyses. The data of one additional 118 
participant were excluded because of technical problems with the EEG recording.  119 
 120 
Experimental procedure 121 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room for the duration of the experimental session. 122 
Participants completed a masked priming experiment in which they additionally were asked to report 123 
about the metacognitive experience associated with their response (see Figure 1). Each experimental 124 
trial started with a fixation cross for 1000 ms. Subsequently, a prime arrow (1.5° wide and 0.7° high) 125 
pointing to the left or right was presented for 34 ms followed by a blank screen for 34 ms. Then, a 126 
target arrow (3.3° wide and 1.4° high) pointing to the left or right was presented for 116 ms followed 127 
by a blank screen. Because the prime arrows fitted perfectly within the contours of the target arrow 128 
(i.e., metacontrast masking; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003), primes 129 
were rendered invisible. This has the major advantage that task performance and metacognitive 130 
experiences are influenced without participants being aware of the visual stimuli driving these 131 
changes (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Desender et al., 2014; Wenke et al., 2010). Participants were 132 
asked to respond as fast and accurate as possible to the direction of the target. They were instructed 133 
to press “d” in response to a left pointing target arrow and “k” in response to a right pointing target 134 
arrow with the middle finger of each hand on a qwerty keyboard. If a response to the target was 135 
registered within 3000 ms, a blank screen was presented for 516 ms, followed by a screen asking 136 
participants a metacognitive question: “How much difficulty did you experience when responding to 137 
the arrow?”. They could answer either by pressing the “o” key with the ring finger of their right hand 138 
(“Rather more difficulty”) or by pressing the “m” key with the index finger of their right hand 139 
(“Rather less difficulty”). The wordings ‘rather more’ and ‘rather less’ were used in order to stress 140 
that the difference between both metacognitive experiences is small, a subtlety that is potentially 141 
lost when using the terms ‘easy’ versus ‘difficult’. There was no time limit to answer this question. 142 
The inter-trial interval was 800 ms. 143 
Each participant started with 20 practice trials in which the metacognitive question was 144 
omitted. Subsequently, the experimenter explained that participants had to rate their experience 145 
associated with a trial after each response. The experimenter motivated participants to use all 146 
information available to them (i.e., difficulty, error-tendency, response fluency) to answer this 147 
question. Participants were informed that there would be an equal amount of “more difficult” and 148 
“less difficult” trials, and they were motivated to keep a balance between these responses. 149 
Participants received 20 additional practice trials with the metacognitive question. After these two 150 
training phases, each participant performed eight blocks of 80 trials each. In each block, half of the 151 
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trials were congruent (i.e., prime and target pointing in the same direction), and half were 152 
incongruent (i.e., prime and target pointing in opposite directions) creating a response conflict.   153 
Only after the main experiment, participants were informed about the presence of the 154 
primes, and participated in a subsequent detection task. In this task, participants were instructed to 155 
categorize the direction of the prime arrows, instead of the target arrows. During the detection task, 156 
targets were neutral with heads pointing in both directions to ensure that participants were not 157 
accidentally responding to the target. The detection task comprised of 100 trials. 158 
 159 
 160 
How much difficulty 
did you experience 
when responding to 
the arrow?
+
34 ms
34 ms
116 ms
1000 ms
Main task
In which direction 
pointed the first 
arrow?
+
34 ms
34 ms
116 ms
1000 ms
Detection task
516 ms 516 ms
 161 
Figure 1. Example of a trial sequence in the main task (left) and in the detection task (right). 162 
Because primes fitted perfectly into the counters of the target, they were visually imperceptible.   163 
 164 
 165 
EEG recording and data pre-processing 166 
EEG data were recorded from 64 scalp locations (actiCHamp, Brain Products GmbH, Germany) 167 
with a sample rate of 500 Hz. Data were segmented from -500 ms to 2000 ms relative to target onset. 168 
First, segments containing artefacts were identified by visual inspection and removed. Next, 169 
eyeblinks were removed using Independent Component Analysis (ICA), removing 1.47 components 170 
on average (range 1 - 2), and segments containing values ±200 µV were excluded using extreme 171 
value rejection. Bad (noisy) channels were replaced by an interpolated weighted average from 172 
surrounding electrodes using the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) in Matlab. Finally, 173 
segments containing further artefacts, identified by visual inspection, were removed prior to 174 
averaging. For plotting purposes only, data were filtered using a 20 Hz low pass filter.  175 
 176 
Statistical approach 177 
In order to perform reliable analyses on our EEG data, a minimum number of 20 trials in each 178 
cell of the 2 by 2 interaction between congruency and metacognition was required. Due to the 179 
nature of our metacognitive measure, the data of nine participants contained less than 20 180 
observations in at least one of these four cells (M = 6, range = 0-15). For seven of them, this was 181 
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caused by very high metacognitive performance (on average 79% correct classifications) leaving too 182 
few incorrect metacognitive responses. The other two participants showed a strong response bias, 183 
using almost exclusively the ‘easy’ option. Due to this unequal distribution, these participants were 184 
excluded from further analysis, leaving 15 participants in the final sample (five males, Mage= 24.5 185 
years, SD = 6.7, range 19-42). Although the final sample size is sufficiently large to perform reliable 186 
analyses, one should keep in mind that this drop in sample size could potentially obscure some 187 
effects. To deal with this potential worry, we qualified our main ERP findings by additionally 188 
computing the Bayes Factor (BF) associated with each effect, using the default priors in the 189 
BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2014). Compared to classical p-values, a BF has the 190 
advantage that it can dissociate between data in favor of the null hypothesis (BF < 1/3), data in favor 191 
of the alternative hypothesis (BF > 3) and data that is not informative (BF ≈ 1), (by Jeffreys's, 1961, 192 
convention). As can be found below, our BF results showed that for all non-significant p-values there 193 
was evidence in favor of the null, whereas for all significant p-values there was evidence for the 194 
alternative hypothesis. The only exception was the main effect of metacognition in the P3 time 195 
window (p = .08, BF = 1.10), where the BF suggested that the data is not informative. To examine 196 
whether metacognitive experiences are related to the N2 and/or the P3, we first examined standard 197 
ERPs. To complement this approach, a more data-driven strategy was used in which a classifier was 198 
trained to predict the congruency status of individual trials, and subsequently it was tested if this 199 
classifier contained information about the metacognitive experience associated with each trial. 200 
Above and beyond the standard ERPs, this approach allows us to examine whether congruency 201 
information in the N2 and P3 is related to metacognitive experiences. Finally, source localization was 202 
used to confirm the relation between the ACC and the N2, and to investigate the neural origin of the 203 
P3.  204 
 205 
ERP analyses 206 
Our main analysis of averaged ERPs focused on the N2 and P3, which are successive 207 
deflections in the stimulus-locked ERP waveforms. Baseline activity was removed by subtracting the 208 
average voltage from -168 to -68 prior to target presentation (i.e., 100 ms period prior to prime 209 
onset). The time windows and spatial topography for the analysis of all ERP components were chosen 210 
based on a grand-average difference plot of congruency (incongruent-congruent), without taking 211 
metacognitive experience into account. As expected, this grand average showed a clear N2 and P3 212 
component. The N2 was computed across electrodes FCz and Cz in the 32 ms period around the peak 213 
of the component as measured in the grand average ERP (Clayson & Larson, 2011). This resulted in a 214 
time window between 246 ms and 278 ms. The P3 was computed on electrodes CPz, Cz and FCz, in 215 
the 100 ms period around the moment where the congruency effect in the grand average ERP had its 216 
largest difference. This resulted in a time window between 360 ms and 460 ms. Subsequently, mean 217 
amplitude was extracted from the specified time windows and the associated electrodes, separately 218 
for congruency (congruent versus incongruent) and metacognitive experience (easy versus difficult). 219 
These mean amplitudes were then submitted to two separate repeated measures ANOVAs (one for 220 
each time window), with congruency and metacognitive experience as within-subjects factors.  221 
   222 
Single-trial analysis 223 
To complement the standard ERP analysis, we also analyzed the data using a more data-224 
driven approach. Based on the results from the ERP analysis (i.e., the interaction between 225 
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congruency and metacognition in the P3; see below), we examined whether information about 226 
congruency on the single-trial level would predict the associated metacognitive experience. To 227 
achieve this, we used single-trial analyses and examined whether a classifier trained on congruency 228 
also contains information about metacognition. More specifically, the N2 and P3 components were 229 
analyzed on individual trials using the logistic-regression based linear derivation method introduced 230 
by Parra et al. (2005). An important advantage of this method is that it does not specify the spatial 231 
topography of the effects beforehand. This approach identifies the spatial distribution of scalp EEG 232 
activity in a given time window that maximally distinguishes two conditions (e.g., congruent versus 233 
incongruent) to deliver a scalar estimate of component amplitude on each trial. The derived 234 
estimates have a high signal-to-noise ratio because the discriminating component acts as a spatial 235 
filter, estimating component amplitude as a spatially weighted average across electrodes for each 236 
trial. The single-trial analysis was conducted separately for each participant by training a logistic 237 
regression classifier to discriminate congruency in either the N2 or the P3 time window. In a first step, 238 
the reliability of the classification was tested using a 10-fold cross validation approach in which the 239 
classifier was trained on 90 % of the trials and tested on the remaining 10 %. This procedure was 240 
repeated 10 times, on each occasion keeping a different 10 % of the trials for testing. For each 241 
participant, we quantified our ability to successfully classify individual trials by calculating the Az 242 
score, which gives the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, derived from 243 
signal detection theory (e.g., Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). To test for the significance of the single-244 
trial classification, the distribution of this Az score was calculated by running 100 permutations of our 245 
classifier. This distribution was then compared to 100 permutations of Az scores using randomized 246 
condition labels, to provide an estimate of the null classification. A different randomization of the 247 
condition labels was carried out at each permutation. Group level analyses were performed by 248 
computing an average per subject over the permutations, and contrasting classifications made with 249 
true and random labels using a paired t-test. In a second step, the classifier was trained to predict 250 
congruency using all trials, and the resulting estimates were applied to all trials. Although this 251 
approach over-fits the data for congruency, it allows us to examine whether a classifier trained on 252 
predicting congruency on individual trials contains information about the metacognitive response. 253 
 254 
Source Localization 255 
Based on the scalp-recorded electric potential distribution, the standardized low resolution 256 
brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) software (http://www.uzh.ch/keyinst/loreta.htm) was 257 
used to compute the cortical three-dimensional distribution of current density (Fuchs, Kastner, 258 
Wagner, Hawes, & Ebersole, 2002; Pascual-Marqui, Esslen, Kochi, & Lehmann, 2002). This method is 259 
based on the neurophysiological assumption of coherent co-activation of neighboring cortical areas, 260 
and computes the smoothest of all possible activity distributions (i.e., no a priori assumption is made 261 
on the number and locations of the sources). Note that, although there is a specific prediction that 262 
the N2 originates from the anterior cingulate cortex (Jiang, Zhang, & van Gaal, 2015; Van Veen & 263 
Carter, 2002), results from these analyses should be treated with caution given the limited spatial 264 
precision of EEG.  This is especially the case for the P3, for which the a priori prediction is unclear. We 265 
conducted this method once on a difference wave of the N2 time window measuring congruency (i.e., 266 
Incongruent - Congruent), and once on a difference wave in the P3 time window measuring the 267 
interaction in the P3 (Easy(Incongruent-Congruent) - Difficult(Incongruent-Congruent).  To analyze these difference 268 
waves, we used a paired-groups analysis, and tested the N2 and P3 time windows in the 269 
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corresponding difference waves, using t-statistics with the variance smoothing parameter set to zero. 270 
Finally, 5000 permutations were performed to compute correct thresholds for t values in order to 271 
test for significance at an alpha level of.05. These computations are performed in a realistic head 272 
model using the MNI152 template, with the three-dimensional solution space restricted to cortical 273 
gray matter. The intracerebral volume is partitioned in 6239 voxels at 5 mm spatial resolution.  274 
275 
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Results 276 
Behavioral results 277 
Metacognitive experience of difficulty  278 
Because performance in responding to the target arrow was at ceiling level (96.7%) and 279 
metacognitive responses to incorrect trials are quite trivial, we deleted error trials (3.3%), trials 280 
following an error (3.1%) and the first trial of each block (1.2%) from all following analyses. Then, it 281 
was examined whether participants’ metacognitive experiences (i.e., whether a trial was as 282 
experienced as easy or difficult), coincided with the actual congruency, which would show evidence 283 
of above chance-level metacognitive performance. Note that one should be careful not to confuse 284 
basic task performance (which was at ceiling level) and this measure of metacognitive performance. 285 
We used the data of the main experiment to calculate a d’ based on signal detection theory 286 
(henceforth called conflict-d), which provides a measure of metacognitive performance while 287 
controlling for response bias (Green & Swets, 1966). Incongruent trials were treated as signal, and 288 
congruent trials were treated as noise. The “difficult” response was considered a hit on incongruent 289 
trials and a false alarm on congruent trials. Hit proportions were computed by dividing the total 290 
number of hits by the number of signals, and false alarm proportions were computed by dividing the 291 
total number of false alarms by the number of trials where no signal was present. Mean conflict-d 292 
was 0.54, showing significant above chance level metacognitive performance, t(14) = 3.01, p = .009. 293 
Participants correctly classified congruent trials as easy and incongruent trials as difficult in 59% of 294 
the trials. Trials judged to be easy were more frequently congruent (36.9%) than incongruent (26.9%), 295 
whereas trials judged to be difficult were more frequently incongruent (22.4%) than congruent 296 
(13.8%). Next, to test if metacognitive accuracy is based on participants’ capacity to introspect on 297 
their own RTs (Marti, Sackur, Sigman, & Dehaene, 2010), a subset of the data was selected in which 298 
RTs for congruent and incongruent trials were matched. For each congruent trial, an incongruent trial 299 
was randomly selected whose RT deviated 5 ms maximally. Trials that could not be matched across 300 
conditions were discarded. In this RT-matched set, metacognitive performance was still reliably 301 
above chance level, conflict-d = .45, t(14) = 2.56, p = .023, with participants classifying 57% of the 302 
trials correctly. This finding shows that participants were able to introspect on the presence of 303 
response conflict, even in the absence of differences in response time1.      304 
To confirm that this above chance-level categorization is not caused by prime perception, 305 
prime visibility was assessed using the data of the detection task. A d’ measure (treating left pointing 306 
primes as signal) was calculated and this measure did not deviate from chance level (i.e., zero), d’ = -307 
0.019, t(14) = -0.25, p =.81, indicating that participants were completely unable to dissociate left 308 
from right pointing primes. Furthermore, no correlation was found between conflict-d and prime 309 
visibility, β1 = -0.361, t(14) = -0.57, p = .57, showing that participants’ metacognitive capacity was 310 
independent from prime visibility. A positive significant intercept, β0 = .53, t(14) = 2.89, p = .013, was 311 
observed, demonstrating that even when prime visibility was statistically zero, we still observed 312 
above chance level metacognitive performance (Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995). 313 
                                                          
1 When analyzing the complete sample (N = 31), these behavioral results were similar. Metacognitive 
performance was above chance level (64% correct), conflict-d = .92, t(30) = 4.79, p < .001. This was also the 
case when congruent and incongruent trials were matched for response time (61% correct, conflict-d = .79, 
t(30) = 4.40, p < .001). Finally, RTs still showed both the main effect of congruency, F(1,30) = 56.84, p < .001 and 
of metacognitive response, F(1,30) =27.01, p < .001.  
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 314 
Target responses 315 
To analyze the responses to the target arrow, median RTs were submitted to a 2 (congruency: 316 
congruent or incongruent) x 2 (metacognitive response: easy or difficult) repeated measures ANOVA. 317 
A main effect of congruency was observed, F(1,14) = 18.46, p < .001: RTs were faster on congruent 318 
(445 ms) than incongruent trials (486 ms). There was also a significant main effect of metacognitive 319 
response, F(1,14) = 12.28, p = .004, indicating that trials labeled as difficult were responded to slower 320 
(521 ms) than trials labeled as easy (465 ms). The interaction between both factors was not 321 
significant, F < 12. 322 
 323 
Electrophysiological results 324 
Stimulus Locked ERPs 325 
Figures 2A and 2C present the grand average stimulus-locked ERPs for fronto-central and 326 
centro-parietal electrodes, respectively, dependent on congruency and metacognitive experience. 327 
We observed an N2 in a time window between 246 ms and 278 ms post-stimulus, located at fronto-328 
central electrodes (FCz, Fz; see Figure 2B), followed by a P3 in a time window between 360 ms and 329 
460 ms post-stimulus, located around central electrodes (CPz, Cz, FCz; see Figure 2D).   330 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors congruency (congruent or incongruent) and 331 
metacognitive experience (easy or difficult) on the mean average voltage during the N2 time window 332 
across electrodes FCz and Fz indeed showed a main effect of congruency, F(1,14) = 10.47, p = .005, BF 333 
= 8.52. The amplitude of incongruent trials was more negative than that of congruent trials. Crucially, 334 
there was no main effect of metacognition, F < 1, BF = 0.29, nor an interaction between both factors, 335 
F < 1, BF = 0.28. A post-hoc t-test showed that even the small difference between incongruent trials 336 
judged to be easy and incongruent trials judged to be difficult that can be seen in Figure 2A was far 337 
from significant, p > .80, BF = 0.27. Exactly the same results were found when the procedure 338 
described above to control for differences in RTs was applied.  339 
 340 
                                                          
2 This same analysis on the error rates yielded no significant effect of congruency, F(1,14) = 3.11, p = .10, a 
trivial main effect of metacognition, F(1,14) = 12.56, p = .003, and no interaction, p > .27. 
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 341 
Figure 2. A. Grand average of stimulus locked ERPs for fronto-central electrodes (FCz, Fz). The 342 
gray bar reflects the N2 time window (246ms to 278ms). B. Voltage plot for the N2 congruency effect. 343 
C. Grand average of stimulus locked ERPs for centro-parietal electrodes (CPz, Cz, FCz). The gray bar 344 
reflects the P3 time window (360ms to 460ms). D. Voltage plot for the P3 congruency effect. 345 
 346 
The same repeated measure ANOVA on the P3 time window on the average of the CPz, Cz 347 
and FCz similarly showed a main effect of congruency, F(1,14) = 35.25, p < .001, BF = 702.17. The 348 
amplitude of incongruent trials was more positive than that of congruent trials. The main effect of 349 
metacognition was close to significance, F(1,14) = 3.63, p = .08, BF = 1.10. Crucially, there was a 350 
significant interaction between both factors, F(1,14) = 8.01, p = .013, BF = 4.40, showing that the 351 
effect of metacognition on the P3 was limited to incongruent trials. Post-hoc t-tests showed that 352 
incongruent trials judged to be difficult and incongruent trials judged to be easy differed both from 353 
each other and from all other trial types (all p’s < .018, all BF’s > 3.42). Only the difference between 354 
easy and difficult congruent trials was not significant (p = .65, BF = 0.29). Again, the same pattern of 355 
results was observed in an RT-matched subset of the data, indicating that our results reflect 356 
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metacognitive experiences associated with response fluency, and not just a mere read-out of 357 
reaction times3.  358 
 359 
Single-trial analysis 360 
First, to get an indication of the robustness of our classifier, we examined the classification 361 
(Az) scores for each participant when predicting congruency based on the N2 (Figure 3A) and the P3 362 
(Figure 3B) time-window. On the individual level, we were able to classify significantly better 363 
compared to random classification for 8 of 15 participants when predicting the N2, and for 9 of 15 364 
participants when predicting the P3. On a group level, both predictions for the N2, t(14) = 3.08, p 365 
= .008, and the P3, t(14) = 3.25, p = .005, were significantly better than random classification. As can 366 
be seen in Figure 3, this data-driven approach gives a topography that is highly consistent with the 367 
ERP analysis. Hence, this single-trial analysis provides us with reliable classification performance. 368 
Next, it was examined whether a classifier trained on all data to predict congruency on 369 
individual trials contains information about the metacognitive response. As such, we extracted 370 
congruency probabilities associated with each trial from the classifier, and submitted these to a 371 
repeated measures ANOVA, with the factors congruency and metacognitive response as within-372 
subject factors. For the P3 time window, this analysis showed the trivial main effect of congruency, 373 
F(1,14) = 329.06, p < .001, and importantly, an interaction with metacognitive response, F(1,14) = 374 
5.64, p = .032. For incongruent trials, the probability scores significantly differentiated between easy 375 
and difficult trials, t(14) = 3.25, p = .005, whereas this was not the case for congruent trials, p > .60. 376 
For the N2 time window, this analysis showed only the trivial main effect of congruency, F(1,14) = 377 
236.87, p < .001, but no interaction with metacognitive report, p > .19. Hence, congruency 378 
information on the individual trial level in the N2 time window does not contain information with 379 
regard to the metacognitive response (see Figure 4). 380 
 381 
 382 
Figure 3. Results of the single-trial analysis. The black dots represent Az scores for individual 383 
participants when predicting congruency based on the N2 time window (A) or the P3 time window 384 
                                                          
3 Note that our results can also not be explained by a difference in signal-to-noise ratio between the four 
conditions. When randomly selecting trials from each condition until the number of observations was matched, 
(separately for each participant), exactly the same pattern of results was obtained.  
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(B). The empty grey boxes show the results of the classifier trained on the same data with 385 
randomized labels. Topographic plots show the scalp projections obtained from the logistic 386 
regression classifier, averaged over subjects. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. 387 
 388 
 389 
Figure 4. Congruency probabilities, separated by metacognitive response. Error bars reflect 390 
95% confidence intervals. 391 
 392 
 393 
Source localization 394 
Our ERP results make a strong case for the P3, but not the N2, being significantly modulated 395 
by metacognitive experience. Next, we examined whether we could link particular brain areas to 396 
these components. First, we examined the neural generator of the congruency effect in the N2. 397 
Given numerous previous reports that this component reflects a sensitivity of the anterior cingulate 398 
cortex (ACC) to competing response demands (Carter & van Veen, 2007), we first wanted to replicate 399 
this finding. In Figure 5A, it can be seen that this prediction is confirmed by the data. A cluster of 400 
voxels in the ACC is more responsive to incongruent compared to congruent trials. Note, however, 401 
that only the maximum peak of activation in this contrast was significant at the .05 level 402 
(MNI coordinates (x, y, z): 10, 25, 35).  403 
Second, we examined the neural correlates of the metacognitive experiences on the P3 404 
component. Because our ERP analysis showed that the effect of metacognition was restricted to 405 
incongruent trials, we computed a single difference waveform representing this interaction 406 
(Difficult(Incongruent-Congruent) - Easy(Incongruent-Congruent)). In Figure 5B, it can be seen that the peak activation 407 
of this contrast is in the left precuneus (MNI coordinates (x, y, z): -20, -70, 20). Apart from this peak, 408 
several other voxels also reached significance at the .05 level (see Table 1). Note that the extent of 409 
these significant areas was quite small, calling for extra caution when interpreting these results. 410 
Therefore, we only tentatively conclude that the interaction between congruency and metacognitive 411 
experience is correlated with activity in the (left) precuneus.  412 
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 414 
Figure 5. Source localization results. A. The congruency effect in the N2 component showed a 415 
peak maximum in the ACC. B. The interaction between congruency and metacognition in the P3 416 
component showed a peak maximum in the left precuneus. 417 
 418 
Table 1. Voxels showing a significant activation at the .05 level (t >  4.078) for the interaction 419 
between congruency and metacognition in the P3. 420 
MNI Coordinates 
t value Anatomical region 
X Y Z 
-20 -70 20 4.93 Precuneus 
-20 -75 20 4.86 Precuneus 
-20 -80 20 4.58 Cuneus 
40 -20 45 4.40 Precentral Gyrus 
-5 30 60 4.37 Superior Frontal Gyrus 
-20 -80 15 4.36 Cuneus 
40 -20 50 4.29 Precentral Gyrus 
5 55 40 4.23 Medial Frontal Gyrus 
-20 5 -40 4.23 Uncus 
40 -20 65 4.21 Precentral Gyrus 
55 -25 35 4.20 Postcentral Gyrus 
-20 10 -35 4.19 Superior Temporal Gyrus 
45 -20 65 4.18 Postcentral Gyrus 
 421 
 422 
Link between behavioral and electrophysiological results 423 
Based on our results, we can conclude that the P3 component is crucially linked to 424 
metacognitive experiences. If this is the case, a relation between behavioral performance in the 425 
metacognitive task (as indexed by conflict-d) and the magnitude of the interaction in the P3 426 
component (reflecting that the effect of metacognition was restricted to incongruent trials) should 427 
be expected. A correlational analysis confirmed this, R² = .32, β = 1.247, t(14) = 2.47, p = .028, see 428 
Figure 6: The better participants were able to behaviorally dissociate easy from difficult trials, the 429 
larger the interaction between congruency and metacognition on the P3 component 430 
(P3(congruency*metacognition) = Easy(Incongruent-Congruent) - Difficult(Incongruent-Congruent)). Note that the size of the 431 
16 
 
standard conflict-P3 component (P3(Incongruent-Congruent)) was not predictive of metacognitive 432 
performance, p = .56. 433 
 434 
Figure 6. Relation between metacognitive performance (conflict-d) and the size of the 435 
modulation between congruency and metacognitive response in the P3 component. 436 
437 
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Discussion 438 
The current study is the first report on the temporal dynamics underlying metacognition. In a 439 
masked priming paradigm, we induced metacognitive experiences of difficulty by subliminally 440 
priming the correct or incorrect response. Because primes were imperceptible, metacognitive 441 
experiences do not reflect metacognition about visual perception, but rather introspection on subtle 442 
differences in task performance. As expected, participants were able to reliably dissociate easy (i.e., 443 
congruent) from difficult (i.e., incongruent) trials. Our ERPs showed that congruency modulated both 444 
the N2 and the P3 component. Crucially, only in the P3, congruency was modulated by the 445 
metacognitive experience of difficulty. Complementing this finding, using single-trial analysis, we 446 
showed that the magnitude of the P3 modulation by congruency on individual trials was predictive of 447 
the metacognitive response. Source localization pointed to the precuneus as the neural generator of 448 
metacognitive experiences, although this finding should be treated with caution given the limited 449 
spatial precision of EEG. In the remainder, we will discuss the interpretation and significance of our 450 
results. 451 
 452 
The P3 and metacognition 453 
Conflict tasks are known to reliably modulate both the N2 and the P3 component (Ullsperger 454 
et al., 2014). Interestingly, we did not find any support for a role of the N2 in metacognitive 455 
experiences. This suggests that the involvement of the ACC is confined to task-related processes, 456 
whereas it is independent of later metacognitive experiences. This finding can aid the interpretation 457 
of ACC activation in studies examining the neural correlates of metacognition (e.g., Fleming, Huijgen, 458 
& Dolan, 2012). This result also adds to the lively debate on the role of awareness in the detection of 459 
response conflicts and response errors, as reflected by the N2 and ERN components, respectively. 460 
Some have argued that these components cannot be observed when the presence of response 461 
conflict (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2003) or response errors (e.g., Scheffers & Coles, 2000; Shalgi & Deouell, 462 
2012) remains below the threshold of awareness, whereas others have challenged this claim (e.g., 463 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O’Connell et al., 2007). As discussed by Wessel (2012), part of this 464 
discrepancy might stem from methodological differences between studies. In particular, studies on 465 
error awareness frequently make use of an extra ‘awareness-button’ that needs to be pressed in the 466 
case of an error, which might not be sensitive enough to detect subtle differences in error awareness. 467 
In the current work, participants rather rated their metacognitive experience on each trial, which is a 468 
more appropriate approach to measure metacognition. Nevertheless, we found evidence that the N2 469 
is sensitive to unconscious response conflict, independent of participant’s metacognitive awareness 470 
(e.g., Jiang et al., 2015). 471 
As mentioned in the introduction, the P3 has already been ascribed several different 472 
functions, such as stimulus evaluation (Coles et al., 1985; Purmann et al., 2011) or the engagement of 473 
attentional resources (Clayson & Larson, 2011; West, 2003). However, because previous studies did 474 
not assess metacognitive experiences, they were not able to determine whether the P3 varies as a 475 
function of stimulus characteristics, such as response conflict, or as a function of subjective 476 
experience (but see Del Cul et al., 2007). Based on the current data, we can conclude that in conflict 477 
tasks the P3 component is actually an expression of the interplay between task-related parameters 478 
(such as response conflict) and metacognitive experiences. Our analysis indicated that even on 479 
individual trials, the size of the modulation of the P3 component by congruency was predictive of 480 
whether participants experienced it as an easy or a difficult trial. This was especially the case for 481 
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incongruent trials, which is reasonable given that only on incongruent trials there is consistent motor 482 
conflict of which participants can become aware. Congruent trials, on the other hand, do not (by 483 
definition) contain motor conflict, and hence congruent trials that are experienced as difficult have to 484 
result from other sources than response conflict. It could for example be that being distracted during 485 
a congruent trial makes you label this trial as “difficult”. While being distracted can lead to difficult 486 
responses on congruent trials, it can never lead to an easy response on incongruent trials, hence it 487 
selectively affects congruent trials. One obvious way to test this distraction hypothesis is to examine 488 
whether RTs to the main target arrow were different on congruent trials that were judged as easy 489 
compared to congruent trials that were judged difficult. We observed that responses were indeed 490 
reliably faster on congruent trials judged as easy (444 ms versus 503 ms), t(14) = 2.79, p = .014, 491 
suggesting that response time serves as a proxy for task difficulty (Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014). 492 
This finding is interesting because, as mentioned in the results section, the effect of congruency on 493 
metacognitive experience was also present in a subset of the data that was matched for RTs, 494 
suggesting that congruency and RT are two independent sources affecting metacognitive experiences, 495 
with only the former modulating the P3. Moreover, note that the EEG waveform associated with 496 
congruent trials labeled as easy or difficult were not different from each other at any other moment 497 
in the epoch (see Figure 2C), strengthening our hypothesis that some source of distraction can lead 498 
to “difficult” judgments on congruent trials. As a final piece of evidence in support of this suggestion, 499 
RTs to the metacognitive question were indeed much slower to difficult congruent trials (M = 528 ms 500 
post-response) than to easy congruent trials (M = 422 ms post-response), p = .03, whereas this was 501 
not the case on incongruent trials, p = .60. In sum, we conclude that our P3 modulation might only 502 
reflect metacognitive awareness caused by response conflict, but not by other sources such as 503 
distractions.  504 
 505 
The neural correlate of metacognition  506 
Interestingly, source localization pointed to the precuneus as the neural generator of the 507 
modulation by metacognition in the P3. Although source localization results of EEG with 64 508 
electrodes should be treated very cautiously, it is nevertheless interesting to note that this finding 509 
fits well within current literature on metacognition. Although initial functional MRI studies pointed to 510 
the anterior PFC as neural correlate of visual metacognition (Fleming et al., 2010; Yokoyama et al., 511 
2010), recent studies have found the precuneus to be related to metacognition in the memory 512 
domain (Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013). Rather than 513 
stressing this difference in modality (i.e., visual versus memory), these findings can easily be 514 
integrated with the current results by assuming that the functional role of the precuneus is to focus 515 
attention on the target of metacognition. A crucial aspect in our task was that metacognitive 516 
judgments were about the experience of task difficulty. Thus, in order to accurately detect which 517 
experience they had on each trial, participants needed to orient their attention internally, which has 518 
been linked to activity in the precuneus (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). The metacognitive 519 
experiences in our task might also be highly related to self-consciousness and self-reflection 520 
(Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Vogt & Laureys, 2005). In line with this suggestion, a recent study argued 521 
that the precuneus may contain common mechanisms for different types of metacognition (visual 522 
and memory; McCurdy et al., 2013), a proposal which fits well with our suggestion that the P3 523 
component reflects the internal orientation of attention. In order to provide more convincing 524 
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support for our claim linking metacognitive experiences and the precuneus, future studies should 525 
aim to replicate this finding using more precise brain imaging techniques, such as fMRI. 526 
 527 
The functional role of the P3 528 
Our data provide a compelling case for a role of the P3 in metacognition, for which we see 529 
two potential explanations in terms of its functional role. First, the most straightforward explanation 530 
is that the P3 reflects a neural correlate of metacognitive awareness. Support for this comes from 531 
several studies claiming that the P3 is a neural correlate of conscious access (Del Cul et al., 2007; 532 
Kouider et al., 2013), studies claiming that the Pe (which has been linked to the P3; Ridderinkhof et 533 
al., 2009) reflects error awareness (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), and a recent study linking the 534 
experience of agency to the P3 component (Kühn et al., 2011). This latter observation seems of 535 
particular interest, given that our methodological approach bears close resemblance to a line of 536 
research on the sense of agency (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 2010). Here, the same 537 
subliminal priming paradigm is used, but responses are additionally followed by a stimulus, whose 538 
color is entirely predicted by prime-target congruency.  Participants are found to experience a larger 539 
sense of agency over colors that follow congruent trials compared to colors following incongruent 540 
trials. Hence, response congruency influences the subjective experience of agency. Given the 541 
resemblance between this research line and ours, the involvement of the P3 component in both our 542 
study and recent work on the sense of agency (Kühn et al., 2011), might point to a general role of the 543 
P3 in metacognitive experiences.  544 
Alternatively, it can also be that the modulation of the P3 component by metacognition is 545 
actually a precursor of metacognition, providing input for metacognitive experiences. Evidence for 546 
this possibility comes from a recent study on error awareness that observed a relation between the 547 
magnitude of the Pe and the criterion that participants had set to signal their errors (Steinhauser & 548 
Yeung, 2010). They found that a high criterion to signal an error resulted in a larger magnitude of the 549 
Pe than a low criterion. From this, the authors concluded that the Pe component reflects an evidence 550 
accumulator sensitive to the amount of evidence that an error was committed, rather than the 551 
neural underpinning of error awareness itself. This is in line with the interpretation of our source 552 
localization results, suggesting that the modulation in the P3 reflects the focusing of attention on 553 
internal information that enables metacognition. Note, however, that this comparison should be 554 
treated with caution. Error rates in conflict tasks are typically below 15 % and are known to produce 555 
large orienting behaviors (Notebaert et al. 2009; Jessup et al. 2010), so simply generalizing the 556 
functional role of the Pe to that of the P3 might be too simplistic. 557 
Finally, an open question for future research will be to examine which specific processes, 558 
apart from congruency between prime and target, determine whether a particular trial will be 559 
experienced as either easy or difficult. We examined the possibility that differences in response 560 
selection might underlie these metacognitive experiences. Another interesting area for further 561 
examination is the role of expectancy in metacognitive experiences of difficulty (e.g., Gratton, Coles, 562 
Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988). For example, expecting a particular response (e.g., left) can lead 563 
to an ‘easy’ experience when this expectation is met, and to a ‘difficult’ experience when it is not met. 564 
Likewise, expecting a target stimulus at a given moment in time can lead to an easy experience when 565 
this temporal expectation is met, and to a difficult experience when the stimulus is unexpectedly 566 
presented earlier or later in time. Interestingly, it could be argued that the mechanism by which 567 
expectations influence metacognitive experiences is identical to that examined in the current study. 568 
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Expecting a particular response to occur, can lead to pre-activation of this response. When this 569 
expectation is not met, there will be a response conflict between the expected response and the 570 
correct response. This competition between incompatible responses will influence both the 571 
performance (i.e., better performance on expected responses) and the metacognitive experience 572 
(i.e., ‘easy’ experience on a predicted response). This very same mechanism can explain the results of 573 
the current study. In our study, when an invisible prime triggers the incorrect response, this creates 574 
the (unconscious) expectation of the incorrect response (Chambon & Haggard, 2012), leading to a 575 
response conflict between the primed and the correct response. This competition between two 576 
incompatible responses will lead to a reduction in performance and a ‘difficult’ metacognitive 577 
experience. Thus, despite the different origin of the response conflict, the same mechanism of 578 
competition between conflicting responses might underlie the modulation of performance and 579 
metacognition, both when the conflict is induced by the expectation of a particular response, or 580 
when this is induced by means of a priming procedure. Future studies could aim to consistently 581 
manipulate expectancy, in order to examine whether the P3 can also be linked to metacognition 582 
when using a different manipulation to influence metacognitive experiences. 583 
 584 
Conclusion 585 
In the current study, we used EEG to dissociate task-related activity from later metacognitive 586 
processes. We observed that both the N2 and P3 component were modulated by congruency, but 587 
only in the P3 we observed an interaction with metacognition. We conclude that the N2 component 588 
reflects only task-related activation, whereas the P3 component reflects an interplay between task-589 
related activation and metacognitive experiences. 590 
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